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Mark Bennister’s comparative study of John Howard and Tony Blair’s
“predominance” offers some fascinating insights into modern prime ministerial
leadership, finds Jill Rutter. The book includes a wealth of comparative detail for
students of government organisation.
Prime Ministers in Power: Polit ical Leadership in Britain and Australia. Mark
Bennister. Palgrave Macmillan. March 2012.
Compared to the very well studied U.S. President ial leadership
campaigns and t ime in of f ice, there is a rather impoverished
literature about Prime Ministerial life and leadership in the UK and
Australia. In Prime Ministers in Power: Political Leadership in Britain
and Australia, Lecturer in Polit ics at  Canterbury Christ  Church
University Mark Bennister is at tempt ing to rect ify that  by looking at
how Tony Blair and John Howard - two mult iple elect ion winning
Prime Ministers – who both dominated their part ies and polit ics for
much of  their t ime in of f ice – marshalled resources to achieve that
popularity and polit ical predominace.
I wanted to review this book, not as a polit ical scient ist , but  as a
long serving civil servant who had worked in No.10 under a less
predominant prime minister – John Major. I was also interested in what made John Howard, who,
as Bennister makes clear, elevated ordinariness into high polit ical strategy, such a durable polit ical
survivor.
For the general reader, the need to assert  that  “leaders matter” may come as something as a
surprise, but of  course to those who have made a career of  academic polit ics, this will be very
familiar territory. And there is a lot  of  rather forbidding jargon – not least  the emphasis on
“mediat isat ion” of  polit ics and its role in increasing the “autonomy” of  Prime Ministers. For the
Brit ish reader there is nothing new about the Blair Prime Minister-ship; Bennister relies ent irely on
secondary sources and anyone who has hung on the biographies, journalist ic accounts and the
Campbell diaries will f ind nothing new. Australian students will no doubt f ind themselves in the
same posit ion on the Howard premiership.
But this is where the comparat ive f rame comes into its own – and that is what makes the book
worth reading. Blair and Howard operated in contexts that were much more dif ferent than the
shorthand of  the Westminster model allows: a much smaller House of  Representat ives (by a factor
of  six); and a much more powerful party with a well organised caucus: more loyalty in Australia with
rebellions pract ically unknown, but much more willing to “spill” leaders not up to the mark. They
were ideological opposites (in theory at  least). John Howard had been Treasurer under Malcolm
Fraser and had had an earlier unsuccessful go at  being leader, before the party turned to him in
desperat ion in 1995 af ter Alexander Downer’s brief  and hugely unsuccessful tenure as Liberal
leader – in stark contrast  to Tony Blair’s leadership by virtual acclamat ion but  lack of  prior
Ministerial experience. Both batt led against  a Chancellor/Treasurer with increasingly obvious
ambit ions to replace them sooner rather than later, but  John Howard managed to suppress and
ult imately out last  Peter Costello.
Within that it  becomes clear that  Howard and Blair achieved their predominance in very dif ferent
ways. Howard devoted far more t ime to party management. Blair’s real connect ion to the party
came through the annual party conference where he could display his oratorical skills and
emotional appeal. But in both cases, they could only exercise their personal leadership with the
cont inuing permission of  their party. Both Howard and Blair adopted strategies to t ry to connect
direct ly with the public to by-pass the more convent ional media – with Howard preferring talkback
radio to overcome his comparat ively untelevisual presence and connect direct ly to his
const ituency of  “mates”. But whatever their gripes about the media, it  is clear f rom Bennister’s
book that the media is a key factor in increasing the autonomy of  the prime minister.
The most interest ing sect ions for any student of  modern Brit ish government are the chapters on
the Cabinet and “controlling and strengthening the centre” (though these are separated by the
chapter on party management). Here the contrasts between the two are stark. Whereas Blair
governed around and despite his Cabinet, preferring to operate through bilaterals and avoiding
formal Cabinet discussion, John Howard governed through Cabinet and the powerful
subcommit tees – not least  the Nat ional Security Council – he chaired. “Cabinet government
funct ioned under Howard: formalit ies were adhered to and debates were robust, helped by
heightened security around deliberat ion”. Bennister notes the dearth of  insider accounts as leaks
were rare. These formal processes were enhances because John Howard had what Tony Blair
clearly lacked – good people management skills. And Howard used the Cabinet to control his
Treasury rival. Those who hanker for the return of  real Cabinet government will be interested in
how Howard used it  to enforce collegiality – and achieve control.
The Australian premier can already draw on a much stronger inst itut ional back up than Brit ish prime
ministers with the existence of  a formal Department of  Prime Minister and Cabinet. Strengthening
the centre – but in an ad hoc way with the addit ion of  advisers and creat ion of  dedicated units,
not least  the strategy and delivery unit , was a feature of  the Blair prime ministership,  but  never
quite managed to give Blair the resources to match those available in the Treasury to support
Gordon Brown. But his lack of  experience meant that  it  took him his f irst  “wasted” term before he
started to work out what he needed to make the centre work for him. The more experienced John
Howard moved very rapidly to assert  control of  the bureaucracy, using DPMC.  Short ly af ter taking
off ice he sacked 6 departmental heads. He also introduced a new dual top of  the of f ice – with a
polit ical appointee as Cabinet Secretary, heading up a newly created Cabinet Policy Unit , sit t ing
alongside the civil service head of  DPMC taking notes in Cabinet.
So there is a wealth of  comparat ive detail for students of  government organisat ion. But for
pract it ioners it  is ult imately f rustrat ing – because while this shines an interest ing spot light  on how
prime ministers can use power and stay in power, it  of fers no thoughts on which of  these Prime
Ministers was more ef fect ive in achieving his policy object ives. It  is about power, but not power for
a purpose. It  would be useful if  academia could look at  that  too – unt il then, think tanks including
the Inst itute for Government will t ry to f ill that  gap.
——————————————————————————————-
Jill Rutter is a programme director at  the Inst itute for Government and a former civil servant. Read
more reviews by Jill.
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